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Sentience: All or none or matter of degree?
Commentary on Sneddon et al. on Sentience Denial
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Abstract: The question of whether fish feel pain is muddied by anthropomorphic thinking.
Comparing biological phenomena in two species should be informed by the criteria for good
animal models: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Viewed through this lens,
we argue that fish do feel pain and may possess some level of sentience. Evolutionary relatedness,
hence similarities and differences between species (fish and humans in this case), are not about
black vs. white but about shades of grey.
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Introduction. Sneddon et al. (2018) make several excellent points about why feeling pain should
not be viewed as a fundamentally different phenomenon in fish compared to higher order
vertebrates such as mammals, including our own species. They touch on many complex questions
about what it is to feel pain or be aware of pain or be sentient. They also discuss how to measure
and interpret pain-induced behavioral responses in fish. The problems are similar to those raised
in this journal by the prior target articles on fish sentience by Woodruff in 2017 and Key in 2016.
The current target article is placed in the context of animal welfare and whether fish deserve the
same attention as mammals in this domain.
Can animals feel pain? A question with many practical consequences. The importance of painful
or aversive conditions and stimuli extends beyond the question of animal welfare. They can have
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significant effects on how animals respond to experimental manipulations. If these effects are
ignored, the results and interpretations may be biased. For example, zebrafish have recently been
found to exhibit a paradoxical reduction of whole-body cortisol levels in response to isolation
(Shams et al., 2017); it has also been shown that their cortisol levels increase under painful or
stressful stimulation (Shams et al., 2017; 2018). So, is isolation a “good thing” for the zebrafish, a
species known for its strong shoaling tendency (Miller & Gerlai, 2011)? Further examination
suggests that the answer is no (Shams et al., 2017). The isolated fish must have had reduced
cortisol levels compared to control non-isolated fish, who were stressed under the standard
housing conditions (Shams et al., 2017): the high density crowding in the small fish tanks and rack
systems preferred commercially (and in the zebrafish community).
A similar realization was mentioned at a recent zebrafish meeting organized by NIH for
discussing the optimal environmental conditions for maintaining and testing zebrafish. At that
meeting, Stephen Ekker (editor of the journal Zebrafish) reported unpublished results (of Karl
Clark) from his institute showing that the standard 96-well plate in which larval zebrafish are
usually tested induces significant stress responses, as compared to when the fish are placed on
the 24-well plate, in which the wells provide a larger volume of water per fish and thus more
space to move around (personal communication with permission from Ekker & Clark). Since
stress, fear and anxiety can reduce pain behavior through stress-induced analgesia,
environmental factors such as housing or testing conditions can have a great impact on the
interpretation of experimental findings in both rodents and fish (see Butler & Finn, 2009, for a
review).
What does it mean to be aware of having pain? Are fish aware of their stress? do they experience
pain? do they experience fear or panic? and do they experience it the way we humans do? First,
let us consider the human infant. Babies are incapable of communicating verbally how much pain
they are in or where it hurts. Should this lead us to believe that they do not experience pain? We
must interpret their cries (pitch, loudness, timbre) and global behavior as proxies for pain.
Shockingly, in the 1980s, a common belief among medical doctors, especially surgeons, was that
human infants did not have the neural circuity sufficient to process pain signals (see McGraw,
1941, for the original paper that formed the basis for this dubious thinking). As a result, infants
undergoing surgery were not administered anesthesia or analgesic medications — only a paralytic
agent so that the surgeon could perform the necessary procedure (McGrath, 2011). Of course,
this is outdated thinking, and now there is a whole sub-field of pain research devoted to
minimizing pain and distress in infants (Hall & Anand, 2014). We have realized our thinking was
wrong and we have changed it.
Our thinking has been slower to change with respect to animal pain and distress behavior. In
principle, the criteria for properly examining whether fish or other animals exhibit stress, pain or
fear are not that different from how one would evaluate the responses of infants or non-verbal
humans. In babies, facial expressions have been validated as a reliable pain assessment tool, and
this same approach has been successfully used in mice, rats, horses, dogs, cats and other species
(Dalla Costa et al., 2016; Langford et al., 2010; Reijgwart et al., 2017; Sotocinal et al., 2011).
Unfortunately for fish, they do not have the capacity for changing their facial expression, at least
not in a way that would be evident to the human observer. This may have led some to conclude
that lower order animals do not experience pain. Although fish may not have clearly apparent
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facial expressions (but see anabantids, e.g., the Siamese fighting fish’s aggressive gill erection
display), they do exhibit a rich repertoire of motor/movement patterns — “gestures” that one
may be able to interpret as reflecting their emotional state or other aspects of their brain function
(Kalueff et al., 2013). Similarly, as pointed out in the target article, fish respond in a predictable
way to algogens (i.e., pain-producing substances) when exposed via the holding water (LopezLuna, Al-Jubouri, Al-Nuaimy, & Sneddon, 2017) or injected (Taylor et al., 2017). The typical
response is a reduction in locomotor activity, easily quantified as diminished distance traveled in
zebrafish larvae/adults. This behavior appears to be an evolutionarily conserved response in
numerous species including mammals (Pitzer et al., 2016). Developing an accurate measure for
“fish-pain” may require more work, but decreased swimming activity already appears to be a
reasonable outcome measure. The observation that administration of the common analgesic
morphine reverses algogen effects on distance travelled in zebrafish (Taylor et al., 2017) supports
this.
Pain assessment tools, whether in fish, birds, rodents or dogs, are based on what some call
“reflexive” responses: We apply a stimulus (mechanical, thermal or chemical) and measure the
response, usually force applied, thermal threshold or time to respond (Mogil, 2009). While
rodents are the preeminent choice of subject for the majority of biomedical research, they are
prey species (especially the mouse) and have a tendency to “mask” their pain when predators are
in the same room, including the human experimenter (Sorge et al., 2014). Nerve-injured animals
often appear to walk just fine, and postoperative mice recover exceedingly quickly (both in terms
of reflexive pain assessment and spontaneous measures). Mice actually recover in ways that
would seem “super-human,” yet we are less likely to label rodents as incapable of pain processing.
For animals, behavior must be interpreted in the context of the species and through a holistic
evolutionary lens. Fish do not communicate pain in a way that is simple and understandable to
humans. We measure and interpret their behavioral responses, but should fish be categorized as
reflexive automata? Most people would agree that rodents experience some degree of pain; we
label their distress as pain, because these species look more expressive to the anthropomorphic
observer. Unlike fish, rodents vocalize and have better-defined behavioral pain responses that
are similar to our own.
Face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Fish are relatively understudied in the
neurosciences. Building a behavioral repertoire in fish has only started recently (Kalueff et al.,
2013). How can we decide about similarities and differences across species like the zebrafish and
humans? How can we tell whether fish respond to and feel pain? The answer is not fundamentally
different from what most scientists struggle with when they try to mimic or model human brain
functions or dysfunctions using animals. What makes a good animal model? The criteria are threefold: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity.
Face validity refers to the requirement that the animal should appear to respond to the
experimental treatment similarly to the way a human would. This is, in effect, a kind of Turing test
for biomedical research. Although fish are separated from humans by about 400 million years of
biological evolution, and although they do differ from us at practically every level of biological
organization, when painful or otherwise aversive stimulation is applied, just like humans, they
respond in a way that is often opposite to what a pleasurable, rewarding or otherwise positive
stimulus/treatment would induce. There are numerous examples of such responses at the
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behavioral and neural levels, down to the level of gene expression. Many are reviewed in Sneddon
et al.’s target article, leaving no doubt that the appearance of the pain response in fish is similar
to what one would expect in humans and other non-human mammalian species.
As one goes deeper in the levels of biological organization, from behavior down towards
genes, one is entering the domain of the second criterion: construct validity: Does pain induce
similar brain responses in fish and humans? Are the changes in the brains of fish and humans
associated with similar molecular interactions and biochemical pathways? The answer is again
nicely treated in Sneddon et al.’s target article: Although many differences and controversies exist
in the literature, there is sufficient evidence of similarities in biological mechanisms underlying
pain perception, pain processing and pain responses in fish and humans.
This leads to the third criterion, predictive validity, which is defined slightly differently
depending on research context. In drug development by the pharmaceutical research industry,
predictive validity concerns whether one can use the animal model to identify small molecules
that would work the same way in humans: Could the animal model predict drug efficacy? This
hinges directly on mechanistic similarity. If the molecular components of the biological
(behavioral) phenomenon — such as pain perception, processing and responding — are at least
partly shared between fish and humans, the same drugs that bind to the fish molecular target and
alter its function should also act on corresponding human molecular targets. The reciprocal effect
has already been shown: several human drugs work quite well (i.e., induce similar functional
changes) in zebrafish (Stewart et al., 2014; Kalueff et al., 2014). This is not just an academic
discussion: pharmaceutical companies are investing millions of dollars in zebrafish and using this
small, prolific, and hence cheap organism for their drug-screening efforts (Fleming & Alderton,
2013).
Similarities and differences. How can one judge similarities and differences across evolutionarily
distant species like fish and mammals? The target article does a good job in emphasizing the
similarities. In most of our own zebrafish papers, we emphasize such similarities too. However,
this may represent wishful thinking rather than objectivity. We do not dispute the importance of
similarities. Most, if not all, existing species are related to each other; thus, some level of
similarity, i.e., evolutionary conservation, is inevitable. How we can evaluate the degree of
relatedness, evolutionary conservation, or similarity? This is relatively simple at the level of the
genome. One can calculate the percentage of homology between the nucleotide sequences of
fish and corresponding human genes, the level of synteny (order of genes on the chromosome)
between these species, and the amino-acid sequence homology at the level of proteins. One can
even study homology focusing on the most important binding pockets of proteins. At this level of
biological organization, the similarity between zebrafish and human amounts to about 70%
nucleotide sequence homology, and a similar percentage of synteny and proportion of genes
having homologs in the two species. The amino acid sequence homology of binding pockets of
proteins can reach an even higher value, approaching or exceeding 90% in some cases. From a
molecular biological viewpoint, fish and humans are clearly not that different. But what does this
mean from the perspective of complex behaviors, including fear, stress, and pain-related
phenomena? Quantifying similarity at this level is quite difficult at best, and quite subjective at
worst.
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Black and white or shades of grey? Framing our questions in the form of “complex behavior vs.
reflexive automatism,” “sentience vs. insentience,” and “feeling pain as we do vs. not” will lead
to misleading answers. We are not even sure that mice and rats process pain/nociceptive signals
the same way we do (Mogil, 2009). Evolutionary relatedness or homologous responses do not
mean sameness. Categorization and dichotomization are inherent to the way humans — scientists
and nonscientists — think. But given what we know about evolution and the considerable
information that biologists have accumulated across a large number of species, biological
similarity, and hence also species differences, are matters of degree. As we argued in a previous
commentary about sentience and consciousness (Gerlai, 2017), pain-related phenomena are
likely to follow a similar pattern: We have no doubt that fish, like all animals, feel pain. The
question is: How similar is this feeling to what humans feel?
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